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Theme1: The French Presidency has been generally recognised to have been successful 
and has helped to restore –at least for a while– the relationship between France and the 
rest of Europe.  
 
 
Summary: The French Presidency of the EU has been very much characterised by 
Nicolas Sarkozy’s personal style and engagement. He tried to demonstrate the EU’s 
ability to protect its citizens and interests and to show leadership on the international 
stage. The planned priorities have been implemented with successful results, including 
the deal on the Energy and Climate Change Package, the adoption of the Pact on 
Immigration and Asylum, the review of the Common Agriculture Policy, the reinforcement 
of the European Defence and Security Policy and the launching of the Union for 
Mediterranean. As regards crisis management, the French Presidency showed its 
capacity to address the challenges of the Irish ‘No’ to the Lisbon Treaty, the war in 
Georgia in August and the financial crisis in the autumn. Although the style and the 
method of the French President were sometimes criticised, as were the difficulties in the 
Franco-German relationship and the poor attention to social issues, this Presidency has 
been generally recognised to have successful and has helped to restore –at least for a 
while– the relationship between France and the rest of Europe. 
 
 
 
Analysis: There are two ways of evaluating an EU Presidency: by looking at the fulfilment 
of its programmed objectives and by assessing its reaction to unforeseen events. From 
these two points of view, the French EU Presidency of the second semester of 2008 is 
generally recognised to have been a success. 
 
The French Touch: Leadership and Pragmatism 
The French Presidency cannot be seen in isolation from the personal engagement of the 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy. 
 
When he was elected in May 2007, he was well aware of the French people’s 
dissatisfaction with Europe, as made evident by the negative result of the referendum on 
the EU Constitution two years before. During his election campaign, Sarkozy proposed a 
way out of the problem, with a ‘simplified treaty’ replacing the Constitution while saving its 
contents, and he agreed to this solution with his European partners shortly after he was 
elected. 
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Although no new referendum is planned in France on the new Treaty, much was at stake 
during the French Presidency from the government’s point of view: nothing less than 
bringing ‘France back in Europe’ and ‘Europe back into France’. The French leaders 
affirmed the necessity of showing Europe’s ability to protect its citizens, to take into 
account their fears, and to confront globalisation. This was the incarnation of the old 
French dream of European puissance. 
 
Sarkozy put all his energy and his leadership in the EU Presidency in an attempt to 
demonstrate Europe’s ability to actively face and manage global challenges. His means 
were voluntarism and pragmatism, which also characterise his style in French domestic 
politics, and contrary to Angela Merkel who, during her EU Presidency of the first 
semester of 2007, was in favour of patient consensus building. Nicolas Sarkozy behaved 
like a ‘Bonapartist’, eager to achieve his political aims. One of the most significant 
demonstrations of his style was the number of meetings of heads of state and government 
he held during his term. Normally limited to two for each Presidency, he raised the 
number to five during the French Presidency, with one additional meeting for the 
launching of the Union for the Mediterranean in July and two extraordinary European 
Council meetings on the crisis in Georgia (1 September) and on the financial crisis (7 
November), which were convened in addition to the normal EC meetings of October and 
December. 
 
On the whole, Nicolas Sarkozy’s method was sometimes criticised as too authoritarian, 
although it proved to be very efficient, probably because he and his teams showed their 
ability to genuinely and relevantly define and implement European general interests, and 
to prepare with care the necessary compromises ahead of the European Council 
meetings along with the Commission and Member States, in particular during the Coreper 
meetings. The very close and efficient relationship between the Elysée and the 
Permanent Representation in Brussels, led by Ambassador Pierre Sellal, was in this 
respect a key factor in the success of the French EU Presidency, while the number of 
European Council meetings was not detrimental to their efficiency, as the French 
Presidency aimed for short and concise conclusions. 
 
France’s Priorities for the EU 
The French authorities had already defined their priorities one year before the Presidency. 
These priorities –energy, the environment, immigration, security and defence– were in line 
with the EU and the French domestic agendas. 
 
Energy policy is a growing priority for the EU largely due to its rising external dependence, 
the rising prices of oil and gas and to the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis in 2006 which 
threatened its supplies. Energy policy is closely linked to the EU’s Environmental and 
Climate policy, whose general objectives where set out during the German Presidency of 
2007 (cutting EU energy consumption by 20% by 2020 and raising the share of renewable 
energies to 20% of global energy consumption). The French Presidency’s aim, in unison 
with the European Commission, was to put these policy objectives into practical and 
regulatory terms through a more eco-friendly economy (including the production of 
vehicles) and through improved energy efficiency. The ‘Energy and Climate Change 
Package’ was agreed during the December European Council meeting, after the 
negotiation of complicated compromises accommodating various strong national interests, 
and despite the less favourable context caused by the economic and financial crisis. The 
package was endorsed shortly after by the European Parliament. 
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However, France did not push the liberalisation of the energy internal market, because its 
own national interests on the issue could clash with its obligations as EU President. As 
regards energy security, the practical results of French ambitions were also modest. 
There was some progress in doctrinal terms in the formulation of EU policy, but in 
practical terms concrete progress was left to future Presidencies (eg, regarding the 
Transcaspian energy corridor and the Nabucco project, which aim to give the EU direct 
access to Central Asian energy resources through Turkey and the Caucasus). 
 
Immigration is another rising priority on the EU agenda, due to the freedom of movement 
inside the Schengen area and to growing external EU competences in the fields of justice 
and home affairs. The French government made this issue a priority for domestic reasons 
also, in order to obtain the EU’s blessing for its double-track policy of controlling legal 
immigration and fighting illegal entries. The Pact on Immigration and Asylum bundled 
several regulatory texts proposed by the Commission and negotiated by the Council and 
the Parliament (such as the ‘blue card’ directive for qualified immigrants), and was 
adopted at the European Council meeting of October 2008. Although some critics 
indicated that there were not so many new elements compared with the Tampere (1999) 
and The Hague (2004) five-year programmes on JHA affairs, the Pact was indeed a 
political document stating an overall common EU policy doctrine on migrations, which is a 
significant political step forward. 
 
Security and Defence issues have been at the top of the EU agenda for 10 years at least, 
and France has always been a key actor pushing for a growing EU role. The issue was all 
the more relevant for the French EU Presidency in the context of the French President’s 
announced intention of bringing France fully back to the NATO military structure: the 
French government had to show that significant progress had been made in the field of 
European security and defence policy in order to make the French public accept the 
decision on NATO reintegration, which turned the clock back on 40 years of Gaullist 
distancing from the Atlantic Alliance. 
 
France pushed for a review of the European Security Strategy (ESS). However, due to the 
complications of redrafting the text negotiated in 2003 –ie, before the Eastern 
enlargement– the review process was limited and materialised in a simple report on the 
implementation of the Strategy by the Secretary General/High Representative for CFSP. 
The report did not change a single word of the ESS, but highlighted the changing context 
of its implementation, made up of major permanent threats to EU Security (proliferation, 
terrorism) but also of ‘new threats’ such as cybercrime, energy security, climate change, 
piracy, failed states, etc. It called for a sustained EU engagement with peace and 
multilateralism. The report was completed by a Council statement on the strengthening of 
international security, that endorsed its main results (December 2008). 
 
EU security under the French Presidency was closely linked to further progress in ESDP 
capacities. France did not try to focus on the ‘ideological’ question of a European 
headquarters, which is the basis for an autonomous planning capacity for European 
ESDP operations but which is perceived by ‘pro-atlanticist’ countries (notably the UK) as a 
useless duplication of the permanent NATO military planning structure. France insisted on 
a more consensual objective which consisted of strengthening ESDP capacities and 
making ESDP and NATO complementary. A declaration adopted by the Council in 
December reiterated and made explicit the so called ‘2010 headline goal’. Accordingly, 
the EU should be able to deploy simultaneously nearly 20 ESDP operations, 12 of which 
can be of a civilian nature (police, rule of law, civil protection, etc) but can be 
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complemented by a number of military operations (two important stabilisation and 
reconstruction operations –of up to 10,000 troops each–, two rapid response operations 
involving EU ‘battle groups’, an evacuation operation for European citizens, an air or sea 
monitoring operation and a military-civilian operation of humanitarian assistance). It was 
decided to unify the EU’s military and civilian strategic planning capacities and to reinforce 
the military air, sea and space cooperation of the EU’s armies, on the field as well as in 
the production of armaments. 
 
As evidence of the growing capacities of the European Security and Defence policy, the 
EU was able –under the French Presidency– to launch three new ESDP operations 
(EULEX in Kosovo, EUMM in Georgia and Atalanta –an ESDP naval operation against 
piracy near Somalia–). President Sarkozy, in his speech to the European Parliament at 
the end of the French Presidency, did not insist too much on the achievements in the field 
of defence. However, he reconfirmed the new French paradigm that NATO and ESDP are 
complementary, and recalled later that France would make its comeback to the NATO 
military structure by the next NATO summit in Strasbourg. 
 
Agriculture was added to the French Presidency’s priorities before it took over. In fact, 
there was not much to expect given the fact that the financing of the Common Agricultural 
Policy is secured until 2013, and that its future will be decided in the context of the 2014-
20 financial perspectives, which will probably have to be negotiated in 2011-13. However, 
the French Agriculture Minister Michel Barnier insisted on having agriculture –a traditional 
priority in France’s EU policy– towards the top of the French Presidency’s agenda. The 
practical results were not overly significant: a limited reform was adopted during the 
French Presidency (including the planned suppression of milk quotas) and a CAP Health 
check was carried out. But the ambition of preserving an ambitious CAP beyond 2013 
failed to be supported by all the member states. 
 
A last priority for the French Presidency was the Union for the Mediterranean, a project 
launched by Sarkozy during his election campaign in 2007. It took nearly a year before 
the original idea and political realities could be reconciled. Sarkozy, encouraged by some 
of his advisors wanted to re-launch Mediterranean cooperation on the basis of an equal 
partnership between Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries, which could even 
have been inspired by the European Coal and Steel Community. The project would have 
pushed aside the Northern European Countries, who are involved in the EU 
Mediterranean policy since at least the launching of the so-called Barcelona Process in 
1995. It could have jeopardised the European integration process itself, giving the 
impression that the new Mediterranean union would have competed with the EU. This 
was not financially sustainable, because the exclusion of part of the EU’s member states 
meant that the Mediterranean Union would not have been able to resort to the significant 
financial means available to EU policies. 
 
The German Chancellor Angela Merkel took the lead in resisting the French initiative. In 
the end, Paris recognised that it was more sensible and more responsible to involve the 
entire EU in the Mediterranean Union. A ‘co-presidency’ was established, which was the 
only reminder of the original project. The European Council approved the re-foundation of 
the Barcelona Process in March 2008, while the Paris Summit of EU and Mediterranean 
partners in July could launch the new Union for the Mediterranean. This was the first 
major success of the French Presidency. 
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On the whole, France did achieve all of the goals it set for its EU Presidency. It did not 
achieve this without adaptations and compromises, but that is typical of EU policy. France 
was able to put its priorities in the long-term framework of the EU agenda, and was at the 
same time able to give it a more national slant, for instance on agriculture, immigration, 
defence and Mediterranean cooperation. 
 
France also ensured the normal functioning of the Presidency, allowing the EU’s 
legislative work to go forward (as in the adoption of the Erika III maritime safety package, 
and the progress made on the revision of the regulatory framework for the telecom sector) 
and leading the EU’s external representation in meetings with third countries (eight 
Summits and nearly 50 ministerial meetings). In the latter field, France did not escape a 
crisis with China (which cancelled the Summit with the EU after Sarkozy met the Dalai 
Lama) but it did use its Presidency to improve its own image in the world. Balancing its 
traditional interest in the Mediterranean, it demonstrated a strong interest in the East, 
promoting an ambitious association agreement with the Ukraine (with a summit in 
September), prepared the ground for the launching of the Eastern partnership under the 
Czech Presidency and engaged actively in the Georgian crisis. 
 
Three Major Crises 
Although France developed an ambitious agenda for its Presidency, public opinion was 
much more impressed by the Nicolas Sarkozy’s crisis management capacity. 
 
The first crisis was the ‘No’ in the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, two weeks 
before the beginning of the French Presidency. Sarkozy, who considered himself the 
father of the new Treaty, made a trip to Dublin in July and claimed –not without raising 
some criticism– that the Irish people should vote again. A way out was found only at the 
end of the French Presidency, when the Irish authorities accepted a new referendum, 
gaining at the same time some guarantees on Irish neutrality, abortion legislation and tax 
system, and also that the Commission would still be made up of a representative of each 
member state (while the Lisbon Treaty in its present shape provides for a reduced size of 
the Commission). The Lisbon Treaty is not yet in force, because of the new Irish 
referendum and the pending ratification of the Czech Republic and Poland, but the French 
Presidency managed to find an acceptable possible solution. 
 
The second crisis was the invasion of Georgia by the Russian Federation in August, 
following an attempt by the Georgian government to re-conquer by force the breakaway 
region of South Ossetia. When he flew to Moscow on 12 August to mediate in a peace 
agreement, Russian troops had already defeated the Georgian army and were on their 
way to Tbilisi. Many, including the former US President, advised against travelling to 
Moscow. But through his two mediations –alone on 12 August and accompanied by 
President Barroso and High Representative Solana on 8 September– the French 
President secured major results: the cessation of hostilities, recognition of Georgian 
sovereignty by Russia, withdrawal of Russian troops from the zones adjacent to Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, the return of Georgian refugees and talks in Geneva on political and 
humanitarian issues after the conflict. This was achieved through the rapid deployment of 
more than 200 EU observers on the ground. 
 
Although it could not prevent Russia from consolidating its hold on the breakaway regions 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and to consequently recognise their independence, the 
French Presidency received the support of the whole EU. The Presidency and the 
Commission tried to limit the consequences of this crisis for long-term EU-Russia 
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relations: they let the talks on a strategic partnership with Russia resume at the end of the 
year, while sending a clear signal that Russia should behave in accordance with its 
commitments. 
 
The financial crisis, which worsened dramatically after the bankruptcy of the US bank 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008, was the third unexpected challenge to the French 
Presidency. Sarkozy actively mobilised his partners by convening several summit 
meetings of the G4, of the Euro zone and of the EU. Europe was able to define a common 
response to rescue its financial system and a common position in advance of the 
Washington G-20 Summit of 15 November, which agreed on common principles regarding 
the regulation of financial markets and the recovery of the world economy. In a second 
step the EU started, despite some diverging views between member states, to develop a 
common plan for economic recovery (1.5% of the EU GDP, agreed in the December 
European Council meeting) to get out of the crisis. 
 
Especially in the Georgian and in the financial crisis, but also on the climate issue, 
Sarkozy’s leadership stood in contrast with outgoing US President George W. Bush’s 
incapacity to deal with these challenges. Probably never in its history has the EU been 
able to take such a firm and united stand on events that the US itself seemed unable to 
face and even to understand. This is probably due to the historical failure of the outgoing 
US President and his neo-conservative advisors, who proved unable to deliver on their 
pro-Georgian stance and who appeared totally out of their depth to confront the worse 
crisis of the capitalist system since 1929. The consequence of this failure was the election 
of Barack Obama, which was too late to jeopardise the end of the French Presidency’s 
leadership. In that respect, the French Presidency appeared to be a unique moment in 
History, in which the US lost for a while its leadership in world affairs. 
 
Two Critical Opinions 
Successful as it was, the French Presidency did not escape some more critical 
judgements on a couple of aspects. 
 
The style of the French President was sometimes criticised, although it is not easy to 
show leadership without authority. Some have accused Sarkozy of being responsible for a 
weakening of the European Commission and for a move by the EU’s institutions towards 
greater intergovernmentalism. It is a fact that the President of the European Commission, 
Durão Barroso, –anxious about his re-election in 2009– appeared to follow Sarkozy’s lead 
during the French Presidency manoeuvres in the Georgian crisis (which was, by the way, 
more relevant to Mr Solana), the financial crisis, the solution to the Lisbon Treaty and the 
climate deal. 
 
It should be noted, however, that the weakening of the European Commission is not 
specifically a consequence of the French Presidency, and had already been noted by 
some observers before that time. This is probably linked to other explanations such as the 
diminishing enthusiasm about European integration among the European peoples (as in 
the negative response to the referendums in France and the Netherlands), the 
enlargement of the EU and of the Commission, etc. 
 
The French Presidency was exceptionally dense in events and crisis. President Sarkozy 
has made use to the utmost of the Presidency’s prerogatives, and has not always shown 
respect for other institutions. But it is a tradition in EU policy that the European Council 
provides the impulse and that whenever it strikes a major political deal it should be 
Area: Europe  
ARI 43/2009 
Date: 17/3/2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 7
accepted by all the institutions, including the Parliament and the Commission. This 
occurred, for instance, in the agreement on the financial perspectives in 2005 under the 
UK Presidency, and in the deal for climate change under the German Presidency in 2007. 
 
To a certain extent, there are elements of the political deals achieved by the French 
Presidency –the climate package, EU-Russian relations, Economic Recovery plan and the 
solution to the Lisbon Treaty– that can always be criticised. But it is fair to recognise that a 
compromise can never make everybody happy about everything. 
 
Criticism of the French-German relationship should also be seen with a sense of 
proportion. It is clear that the personal relationship between the two leaders is not easy, 
and that there were and still are certain basic differences, for example on the 
Mediterranean Union or in the reaction to the economic and financial crisis. This requires 
political compromises between the two countries. But it should not be forgotten either that 
there is a significant convergence in regard to the Lisbon Treaty, the Georgian crisis and 
in the objectives of the climate-change policy. Just as the German Presidency in 2007 
was the Presidency of all EU member states and did not specially focus on its French 
partner, the French Presidency of 2008 could not focus primarily on the French-German 
relationship. The main question, however, is to know if the two countries and their leaders 
will now feel the need and prove able to revive their special relationship in order to 
produce a positive leadership for the EU, which is all the more necessary because the 
running of the EU system is increasingly difficult and complicated. 
 
A last series of criticisms is of a more political nature. Despite some attempts by the 
French government, social policy was not a priority of the French Presidency. President 
Sarkozy, although keen to call for a social Europe, did not insist on this aspect in his 
Presidency programme of July 2008 when he spoke to the European Parliament. The fact 
is that in December the directive on work time was rejected by the European Parliament, 
and some French socialists rejoiced at this failure of the French Presidency. The fact is 
also that the financial and economic crisis forced the government to promote, domestically 
and on the European and world stage, more state intervention, if not more social policy. 
 
Conclusion: These criticisms do not really cast a shadow over the achievements of the 
French EU Presidency, the success of which was broadly recognised in France as well as 
inside and outside the EU. France has recovered much confidence and credibility in 
Europe after the negative result of the referendum in 2005 on the European Constitution. 
The French people are again proud to be European. France’s turn as President will not 
return for more than 20 years, and what is at stake now is for the French authorities to find 
other ways of preserving these achievements in the hard times to come. 
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